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Imagine the following news release:
TRIPOLI--An American naval task force has clamped a tight blockade on this North African city, and
soon will begin a heavy bombardment calculated to reduce hostile fortifications and warships. This task
force is the third launched by the US Navy. The first two failed due to a lack of resources, a result of
budgetary constraints imposed by a cost-cutting Congress.
The President, facing heavy congressional criticism for his North African policies, has pledged that this
latest effort will be the beginning of the end for the hostile regime in Tripoli. That regime has taken
control of most of North Africa and has subjected the United States and European powers to a decade of
extortion and terrorism.
The American public is particularly concerned with the fate of the crew of a US Navy frigate. These
American sailors have languished in one of Tripoli's hellish prisons for a year after their ship ran aground
while pursuing an enemy warship.
A hypothetical, futuristic scenario? Hardly. This account describes events that occurred in the year 1803, during the
administration of Thomas Jefferson.[1] In the popular memory of American military history, other events have
overshadowed the war between the United States and Tripoli. And as with the memory of its military history, in the
American conception of its future security other concerns likewise overshadow the significance of North Africa. If,
however, there is any validity to George Santayana's warning that "those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it," then the American experience with North Africa in the early 19th century is an episode we
should strive to recall in order to avoid repetition.
This article explores present-day security issues pertaining to North Africa. It traces the background of those issues
and outlines their current framework, concluding with recommendations for NATO military policy that will reduce the
risks of confrontation and enhance the potential for a security partnership with the North African region.
The Historical Dimension
There was a time, many centuries ago, when the North African littoral was an extension of European culture. In the
third century, North Africa was incorporated into the Roman Empire. When Christianity became the official religion of
the Empire, North Africa became integrated into the larger unity of Roman Europe by culture, values, and beliefs. The
Mediterranean Sea at that time was truly "Mare Nostrum" ("our sea"), a maritime highway connecting culturally
similar communities on the southern European and northern African coasts. Then, in the seventh century, Islam spread
throughout North Africa, completing the conquest of the region by the year 710. From that point on, language, religion,
and culture no longer united North Africa and Europe. The Mediterranean could no longer be described as "our sea";
rather, it became one of the world's great cultural barriers, marking the frontier between the Greco-Latin Christian
culture of Europe and the Arabic Muslim culture of North Africa.
For more than a thousand years, the history of this region has been a litany of struggle as each of the two cultures has
endeavored to become dominant. This strife has given the Mediterranean Sea a strategic significance out of proportion

to its size. In the words of the American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan:
Circumstances have caused the Mediterranean Sea to play a greater part in the history of the world . . .
than any other sheet of water of the same size. Nation after nation has striven to control it, and the strife
goes on. Therefore a study of the conditions upon which preponderance in its waters has rested, and now
rests, and of the relative military values of different points upon its coasts, will be more instructive than
the same amount of effort in another field.[2]
In the modern era, the struggle to dominate the Mediterranean and North Africa was the prerogative of European
powers. In April 1797, for example, Bonaparte wrote to the French Directory, "The day is not far off when we shall
appreciate the necessity of seizing Egypt, in order really to destroy England."[3] The following summer, in July 1798,
Bonaparte led an expeditionary force to subdue Egypt, but he soon learned that the defeat of the Mamelukes could not
guarantee French rule in North Africa if a hostile power dominated the Mediterranean. The next month the British
navy caught the French Mediterranean fleet at Abukir Bay near Alexandria, and, in a couple of hours, destroyed it.
British naval superiority in the Mediterranean was more decisive than Bonaparte's land victories, and the French were
forced to withdraw.
The Napoleonic wars created the conditions under which the pirate rulers of the Barbary States arose at the beginning
of the 19th century, leading to the intervention of US forces described at the beginning of this article. The postNapoleonic European balance of power provided the context for the European conquest of North Africa. Between 1815
and 1914, European powers established their hegemony: Spain and France in West Africa and Morocco, France in
Algeria and Tunisia, Italy in Libya, and Britain in Egypt.

Figure 1. North Africa and the Mediterranean Basin.

The European rivalry for dominion in North Africa would influence the major crises of the 20th century. In the
summer of 1911, for example, the German government dispatched the warship Panther to the Port of Agadir, on the
Atlantic coast of Morocco. The ensuing crisis with France brought the world to the brink of war, a point where, in the
words of Winston Churchill, "It is so easy to lose one's balance . . . a touch, a gust of wind, a momentary dizziness,
and all is precipitated into the abyss."[4] But for the grace of providence, a miscalculation associated with the
Moroccan crisis of 1911 would be remembered as the spark that set off the World War rather than the Bosnian crisis

three years later.
During the Second World War, Great Britain understood the importance of domination of the Mediterranean and North
Africa. Whichever side, the British or the Axis, gained control over this region would displace the other as an imperial
power. Subsequently, even during the dark days when the security of the British Isles was in question, Churchill would
argue: "The British domination of the Mediterranean would inflict injuries upon an enemy Italy which might be fatal to
her power of continuing the war. All her troops in Libya and in Abyssinia would be cut flowers in a vase."[5]
Twentieth-century political developments in North Africa were greatly influenced by the tendency of European
colonies to develop their own political identities. These were sometimes at variance with policies in the home
countries. The Spanish Civil War, for example, began as Spanish army fascists launched operations from Spanish
Morocco. French resistance to the Vichy regime found a refuge in North Africa, as did the opposition to the Fourth
Republic in the late 1950s. It is perhaps ironic that the behavior of European inhabitants of North African colonies set
an example of political opposition that would eventually result in the independence of these colonies from European
rule.
Upon granting independence to their North African colonies, European powers attempted to install indigenous
governments that would be well disposed to their former colonial masters. These attempts were frequently
counterproductive. Charismatic leaders, who drew strength from their anti-Western orientation, overthrew pro-Western
regimes. The first emerged in Egypt in 1952, as Gamal Nasser rose to power by displacing the rule of Egypt's decadent
King Farouk. A similar development occurred in Libya in 1969, when an officers' coup led by Colonel Muammar alQadhafi overthrew the monarchy of King Idris.
In Algeria, the independence movement was too strong for the former colonial ruler, France, to choose the nation's
leaders after independence. Algeria's Ahmed Ben Bella had impeccable anti-French credentials. Ben Bella was,
however, French educated, and had fought with the French army during World War II. Consequently, during his rule
there was a dialogue between Algeria and France. In 1965, however, the army commander, Houari Boumedienne,
overthrew Ben Bella. At this point Algeria became a leader of developing countries and adopted policies that were
often critical of the West.
The emergence of an independent North African political identity does not necessarily, of course, imply a perpetuation
of rivalry with the West. It remains to be seen whether the North African peoples will evolve into capable partners or
powerful rivals of the Europeans in the Mediterranean. What these trends do suggest, however, is that North Africa
continues to be a region the West cannot afford to ignore.
Population As a Risk Factor
A 1997 French study on Mediterranean security suggests a correlation between population trends and the dominance
of the European or African side of the Mediterranean. In the year 1000, the high point of Moslem influence in North
Africa and Europe, the populations of the two regions were roughly equal, with a slight advantage on the North
African side. By the 13th century, the European population was greater by a 3:1 ratio. This advantage grew to 5:1 by
1850, and between 1850 and 1900, the high point of European colonization, the European countries of the
Mediterranean had a combined population of 90 million, compared with 18 million on the North African side. By
1950, population trends began a reversal, a 2:1 ratio (140 million on the European side, 70 million on the North
African side) characterizing the age of decolonialization. In 1985 the populations were roughly equal at 180 million,
and by 1993 the North African population had grown bigger than the European, 194 million to 184 million. According
to United Nations estimates, by the year 2000 the North African population will exceed that of Mediterranean Europe
270 million to 200 million, and by 2025 the figures will approach a 2:1 ratio in favor of the south, 370 million to 200
million.[6]
Whether or not the shift in population implies a shift in power, the burgeoning North African population has been
recognized as a potential risk in its own right. Rapid population growth in underdeveloped areas leads to unregulated
immigration, and Europe's Mediterranean nations are concerned about the effects of an influx of North African
immigrants. Among the undesirable consequences of unregulated immigration are the rise of an already high rate of
unemployment in Europe; an increase in racial and religious tensions; terrorist activities, either directed against the

host government or intramural terrorism transported from the countries the immigrants left; and drugs and drug-related
crime, as a youthful population of unemployable immigrants finds itself with too much idle time, too little opportunity,
and no way to obtain drugs other than crime.[7] Risks such as these arising from the south shore of the Mediterranean
have already caused some commentators to refer to North Africa as the "Mexico of Europe."[8]
NATO's leadership recognizes the risk of unregulated immigration. A 16 April 1997 report of NATO's Special
Mediterranean Group (GSM), cites an "immigration explosion" as the "principal fear" among the public in European
countries.[9] This report goes on to say:
The Alliance as such has no means of eliminating the economic and social ills that afflict the countries on
the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, ills that are among the root causes of the instability
in the region. NATO can do no more than provide for responses to the consequences of this instability in
terms of operations to evacuate nationals of member nations in the event of escalating violence or anarchy
in a particular country, to prevent large-scale influxes of refugees by sea, or emergency aid when groups
are endangered.[10]
Some Allied countries are dissatisfied with this attitude, suggesting that it signifies a washing of the hands of the
Mediterranean's main concerns. The French, in particular, are prone to blame the United States for a lack of interest.
The French view American membership in NATO as a means for the United States to intrude into European affairs,
wanting to play a role commensurate with its power, but only in regions like the eastern Mediterranean where its
interests are paramount. It is up to the Europeans themselves to address the concerns of western North Africa. France,
with "an essential role to play in the Mediterranean," supported by Spain and Italy, must resolutely endeavor to align
US and European policies without compromising European interests. The French see themselves as the Allied nation
which must exert the leadership to convince other Europeans of the necessity of such policies.[11]
But measures to address the risks posed by immigration do not fit easily within NATO's perception of itself. There is
no question that control over immigration is a European security interest, and Article 4 of the NATO treaty obliges
member nations to "consult" when the security of any member nation is threatened. The treaty requires no collective
defense action, however, when interests are threatened but not subjected to attack. According to Article 6 of the treaty,
collective defense applies only when the territory, forces, vessels, or aircraft of a member nation come under attack in
Europe, North America, the Atlantic Ocean north of the Tropic of Cancer, or in the Mediterranean.
In large measure, then, it is unrealistic to expect NATO to act in the face of nonmilitary risks. Coordination of
immigration laws and customs practices and an enlightened strategy of investment and development seem much more
relevant to the immigration problem than anything NATO might do, and such policies are more in line with the
functions of the European Union (EU) than NATO. Indeed, immigration from North Africa may be a good example of
one of those risks the European foreign and defense ministers had in mind at the 1991 Western European Union
Council of Ministers when they described the "European level of security," of concern to European countries but not to
the United States.[12]
The Military Risk Factor
There is, however, an emerging risk in the Mediterranean in which US and European interests are clearly aligned, and
in response to which the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty would undoubtedly apply, and that is the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their long-range delivery systems. A 1996 RAND study concludes:
"Within ten years, it is possible that every southern European capital will be within range of ballistic missiles based in
North Africa or the Levant."[13]
In the area of ballistic missile development, Libya currently leads the countries of North Africa, a possible recognition
that Libya's conventional military potential falls short of Qadhafi's aspirations. Libya leads the region in ballistic
missiles deployed, chiefly in the form of 80 Scud-Bs, with a 300-km range.[14] Of particular concern is the Libyan
effort to develop a longer-range (950 km) missile known as "Al Fatah."[15] Libya has also shown a willingness to use
ballistic missiles against Western targets. In 1986, in response to the US bombing of Tripoli, Libya launched two
Scuds in an unsuccessful strike against a US Coast Guard facility at Lampedusa, an Italian island located midway

between the Tunisian coast and the island of Malta.[16]
Furthermore, Libya is also the North African country most heavily committed to the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction. Libya's nuclear aspirations have a long, well-documented history. Though Libya has no known uranium, it
has since the 1970s attempted to purchase the materials required for nuclear weapons from China, Pakistan, India, the
Soviet Union, Belgium, Argentina, and Brazil.[17] Qadhafi has called upon Arab states to acquire nuclear weapons,
despite Libya's obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[18] In addition to its efforts to acquire a nuclear
capability, Libya has developed a successful chemical weapons program. The chemical weapons production facility at
Rabta is believed to be one of the world's largest, capable of producing 1.2 metric tons a day of mustard and nerve
gases.[19] Poison gas is believed to be stockpiled near Tripoli and at Sabha, 750 km to the south.[20] Libya reportedly
used chemical weapons during its 1986-87 war against Chad.[21]
While Libya's ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction may pose an immediate threat, Algeria may be the
greatest potential threat over the long term. Algeria today is the country faced with the most serious prospects of antiWestern instability driven by Islamic fundamentalism. In the short term this instability has caused Algeria, once noted
for its assertiveness in international affairs, to turn its attention inward. If Islamic forces rise to clear dominance,
however, Algeria has the potential to become a leading source of concern for the security of the Mediterranean region,
from the North African and the Southern European perspectives.[22]
Algeria has no history of chemical warfare or ballistic missile research, but since 1989 it has been involved in nuclear
research in collaboration with China. Algeria operates two reactors, one developed in conjunction with the Argentines
called "ARR-1," and the other, designated Es SALAM, in conjunction with China. The CIA has estimated that these
reactors give Algeria the capability to produce three kilograms of plutonium every year.[23] Algeria is a signatory to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and as such is obliged to submit to inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Nonetheless, the secretive nature of collaboration raises concerns about Algeria's long-term nuclear
intentions. If the Chinese connection leads to the acquisition of ballistic missiles, these concerns will become still more
serious.[24] In a May 1993 interview, an unidentified Algerian diplomat said ominously, "In ten years time there will
be two countries in Africa which are taken seriously by the United States--South Africa and Algeria--both will be
nuclear powers."[25]
A third state that cannot be discounted for its potential to develop ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction is
Egypt. Egypt's chief interests concern its standing among other Arab and Muslim countries. It is a country of
significant military resources and potential leadership, but its ties to the West and its participation in the Camp David
peace process have resulted in a great deal of internal and external retaliatory pressure. Should the Islamic opposition
rise to power in Cairo, a prospect which may be more remote than in Algeria but which still is within the realm of
possibility, the effect on proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction could be immense.[26]
It would be wrong, of course, to characterize the entire North African region as uniformly hostile to the West.
Instability and proliferation threaten Western-oriented North African countries even more than they threaten European
countries. Two countries in particular, Morocco and Tunisia, find themselves caught in the middle. Both run risks
because of their economic ties and political dialogue with the West. The last traditional monarchy in the region,
Morocco relies on Europe for roughly 65 percent of its trade.[27] Morocco is pursuing cooperative agreements with
southern European governments concerning access to markets in exchange for controls on the movement of labor.[28]
Tunisia, the most westernized and developed country in the region, does about 75 percent of its trade with Europe, and
some 500,000 Tunisians work abroad, most in France.[29]
Both Morocco and Tunisia are justifiably worried about growing European animosity deriving from cultural prejudice
compounded by resentment toward immigrants. Morocco has expressed its concern about European xenophobia toward
the nations of the Maghreb, and the mistreatment of Tunisian immigrants in Europe is a recurring theme in the
Tunisian press.[30]
The Western Response--A Divergence of Rhetoric and Action
Both the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO have noted the potential threat from North Africa. The October
1991 issue of NATO Review discusses NATO's relations with the countries of the Mediterranean, citing the dialogue of

the so-called "4+5 Group" (Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy [Malta later joined this dialogue], plus Mauritania,
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya).[31] This initiative was the result of a French proposal tabled by President
Mitterand during the Marrakech conference of 1991. The conference also marked the beginning of the so-called Arab
Maghreb Union, which provides a forum for collaborative dialogue on the North African side.[32]
A May 1993 report of the WEU's Technological and Aerospace Committee expressed the view that:
Islamic fundamentalism can in fact become a potential security risk for Europe when it is combined with a
complex of inferiority vis-à-vis the technical superiority of the western world . . . . Studying the lessons of
the last part of the Second World War today, countries which do not have the aircraft to conduct a
strategic bombing campaign might adopt the less complicated and less costly alternative of an
indiscriminate missile attack.[33]
The WEU report recommended the creation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean
(CSCM), similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The report also advocated the
"installation of a multilateral safety belt" to protect Europe from "instability and crisis prevalent among the countries
of the southern shore of the Mediterranean," and "bilateral cooperation between various western countries and
countries of the south."[34]
NATO institutions oriented on the problem of Mediterranean security include the Senior Politico-Military Group on
Proliferation and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation.[35] The first of these high-level groups is responsible for
the political and preventative aspects of NATO's "approach" to dealing with proliferation, the second for "considering
how NATO's defense posture can support NATO's non-proliferation efforts but also provide protection should those
efforts fail."[36] Closely associated with those efforts is the work of the NATO Air Defense Committee, which since
1992 has been investigating requirements for ballistic missile defense against threats around the periphery of the
Article 5 area, leading to the concept of "extended air defense/theater missile defense."[37] A policy framework
adopted at the June 1995 ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council stated that NATO must employ both
political and military capabilities to "discourage WMD proliferation and use, and if necessary, to protect NATO
territory, populations, and forces."[38]
NATO's official pronouncements concerning the potential threat from North Africa have paralleled but been more
measured than those of the WEU. In February 1995, NATO foreign ministers initiated a dialogue with Egypt, Israel,
Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia. This move came as a result of French, Italian, and Spanish pressure to concentrate
on instability in the Mediterranean in part to offset what these countries viewed as a "lopsided" emphasis on the part of
the United States and Germany to fill the security void in eastern Europe.[39] As The Washington Post reported,
NATO sources identified a "clear consensus among military experts that the most immediate security dangers to the
Alliance stem from the Mediterranean basin and not from Eastern Europe."[40] These same officials described the
envisioned dialogue as taking the form of "discussions with the governments involved about what they see as the
major threats to regional security" and "what forms of cooperation they might explore with the Alliance."[41] NATO
was quick to point out the limits of that cooperation, however. A program along the lines of the "Partnership for
Peace," prescribing exercises, training, and collaboration in anticipation in future NATO membership, was described as
"premature."[42]
For a time, European governments seemed to pursue these proposed initiatives with remarkable enthusiasm. In March
1995 the Washington Times reported that "plans for a new air defense system to protect Europe against ballistic missile
attacks from North Africa reflect the seriousness with which Western strategists view rising Islamic militancy."[43]
The Times quoted a "European security source" as saying:
Western Europe is under threat and must develop weapons and strategies to counter it. For the past two
years, the main concern among NATO's military strategic experts has been the southern threat [to include]
Islamic extremism, demographic pressure, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means
to deliver them.[44]
The Times went on to describe the Medium Air Defense System (MEADS), which complements the advanced Patriot

air defense system to provide a combination of low- and high-altitude air defense coverage.[45]
As it turned out, the Times article was unrealistically optimistic on the subject of MEADS. As Military Technology
later reported, MEADS lost most of its momentum when it became evident that the participating nations had
incompatible operational requirements.[46] Military Technology concluded: "It should be appreciated that no
conceivable amount of technical, industrial, operational, and financial problems and difficulties would be enough to
stop MEADS--provided that there is a general political will backing it."[47] The comments of the Washington Times'
"European security source" notwithstanding, that will appears to be lacking.
Subsequent developments have proceeded along divergent lines, with discord arising between eastward-oriented
NATO countries (such as the United States and Germany) and southward-oriented NATO countries (such as France,
Italy, and Spain). France had proposed a trilateral air and naval force at the November 1992 ministerial meeting of the
WEU to respond to Mediterranean contingencies, and at the May 1995 ministerial meeting this force was expanded to
include a ground component.[48] Soon after the three countries signed the agreement to establish this force, Portugal
applied for and was accepted as a participant.[49] In addition, France has taken the lead in the development of a range
of military capabilities which had been the province of American forces. Examples include advanced air defense,
electronic command and control and radar systems, and airborne surveillance, all being developed as a result of
collaboration between France and Israel.[50] France also leads the effort to establish a European system of surveillance
satellites, most notably the "Helios 1A" military satellite, which was launched in July 1995 as a result of a cooperative
effort among France, Italy and Spain.[51] In themselves, of course, these efforts pose no threat to the United States
and could be viewed as a welcome European contribution to its own regional security. In the context of the current
Franco-American debate on NATO leadership, however, these developments take on a different significance,
suggesting a French longing to return to the days when the Mediterranean was "a region where French foreign policy
should hold sway."[52]
Given the divisive nature of the dialogue, it is perhaps not surprising that the proceedings of 1997 lacked some of the
enthusiasm of the previous two years. In anticipation of NATO's 1997 summit in Madrid, Secretary General Javier
Solana called for "moving further ahead on our Mediterranean dialogue" as one of six major summit issues.[53]
Secretary General Solana's expectations of progress were, however, rather modest. He called for "good, strong and
friendly relations across the Mediterranean" by means of a dialogue which would "complement other international
efforts, such as ones carried out by the EU, OSCE, and WEU."[54]
In a complementary article written for Mediterranean Quarterly, Secretary General Solana reiterated the need for
NATO to build on the work already done by the EU and the WEU, citing specifically the Mediterranean dialogue with
the Maghreb countries and the proposal for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean.[55] At
the same time Secretary General Solana bemoaned the Western tendency toward pessimism in this region,[56] and
called for stability and confidence-building through dialogue. He stopped short, however, of calling for a
Mediterranean version of a Partnership for Peace on the grounds that "simply extending the Partnership for Peace and
its activities to Mediterranean dialogue partners would lose the nuances and sensitivities on which the present dialogue
is based."[57]
Perhaps the final word describing NATO's current attitudes toward the risks emanating from the Mediterranean came
in a 16 April 1997 report of conclusions drawn from a December 1996 meeting of the Special Mediterranean Group.
This report concedes that NATO "must respond to the risks of a more military nature that are emerging in the
region,"[58] but then downplays those risks. Describing the previously cited RAND study as "alarmist,"[59] this report
characterizes the danger of proliferation in the Mediterranean as "a south-south" risk, "not aimed at the north."[60]
While the report goes on to recommend a number of sensible steps in dialogue and diplomacy, it cautions that "the
Alliance can hardly go beyond the concerted action already handled satisfactorily . . . in the international fora without
hampering the operation of those fora."[61] NATO, the report adds, ought not to pursue the installment of missile
defense systems because the majority of member nations regard "the risk as relatively low when set against the
prohibitive cost."[62] Considering that "only the United States has the means required to install high-performance
missile defense systems" and that within the United States "enthusiasm seems to be waning,"[63] the prospect of a
meaningful military response seems remote. The use of military resources should be limited, the report recommends, to
"improving ways of warding off possible threats . . . in the context of peacekeeping or peace restoration

operations."[64]
A Proposed Way Ahead for Military Preparedness
There seems to be an element of wishful thinking or, perhaps more accurately, whistling in the dark concerning these
complacent assessments. If the most Westward-oriented of the Maghreb countries, Tunisia and Morocco, were to fall
into the hands of hostile regimes, either through military conquest or religious-sponsored subversion, the immediate
danger to Europe might not increase. Clearly, however, the risks of instability, hostility, and proliferation would have
advanced much closer to Europe's Mediterranean coast and sea-lanes, which the United States has declared to be
major interests. Thus, a second order effect of a "south-south" conflict is a danger aimed directly at regions where
NATO's Article 5 guarantees apply.
Further, the military capacity of the threatened countries would be inadequate in a "south-south" conflict. As the figure
below illustrates, their problematic neighbors in key indices of military power outclass both Morocco and Tunisia,
especially if the threatening countries were ever to enter into coalition.[65]
-
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Figure 2. Indices of power in North African countries.

If, as NATO claims, the security and continued good relations of Westward-leaning North African countries is an
Allied interest, policies to maintain this security must have a military dimension as a matter of urgency and priority.
As Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, Commander in Chief of NATO's Allied Forces Southern Region (AFSOUTH), has
expressed it: "No other NATO headquarters has the need to address stability risks with a sense of immediacy as does
AFSOUTH."[66]
As a modest first step, NATO's Defense Group on Proliferation should consider what measures would stabilize the
region without compromising the security of friendly states. A survey of missile defense requirements would be a good
place to start. An extended missile defense warning line, established as a cooperative NATO-North African initiative,
might go a long way toward signaling potential enemies that NATO will not be caught unawares and assuring friendly
countries that NATO will do more than pay lip service to their security requirements.
Such an initiative would fundamentally alter the relationship between NATO and participating North African countries,
requiring a reciprocal partnership between them. In this regard, it is unfortunate that the Partnership for Peace program
instituted with eastern European countries has been identified with eventual NATO membership. A true "partnership"
between the Alliance and non-member countries is more vital today than ever before. The North Atlantic Treaty makes
no provision for the guarantee of a non-member nation's security, but in reality NATO could not stand idly by while
friendly North African countries were overrun any more than it could if the new eastern European democracies were
attacked. A statement that a change of frontiers or of governments in the region would be viewed as a grave
development to Mediterranean security would lend stability to a region where NATO cannot evade certain obligations
anyway.
Of course, neither the most technologically advanced air defense measures nor the most enlightened diplomacy can
overcome completely the uncertainties and challenges of ballistic missile defense. The only capability that would

surely deter the type of rogue regime that would entertain the idea of a attacking a non-offending country is the clearly
apparent capability to intervene with decisive force. Hence, the ultimate partnership would be operations of a NATO
combined joint task force (CJTF), including the participation of indigenous forces, to deter a threat or to defeat an
enemy should deterrence fail. Planning for this type of partnership may be premature, but it is not too early to begin a
process of military-to-military contacts to build confidence and establish relations.
The multinational force discussed by the WEU, with its French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese components, might
serve as a suitable instrument for CJTF planning. There is a danger here, however, that non-participating members will
appear to be unconcerned or uncommitted to the goals of Mediterranean stability and security. Unlike other security
and stability issues under discussion, the proliferation threat is not a peripheral concern to NATO--it is a core strategic
issue. Accordingly, NATO's political leadership must exercise care that a military force resulting from a southern
"coalition of the willing" still represents the collective will of the Alliance as a whole. It is difficult to conceive of an
effective deterrent of any type which does not include forces from, and represent the determination of, the United
States. An American appreciation for southern European views on North African questions is essential to maintaining
the solidity of NATO.
Conclusion
NATO's North African policies for the next century require a military dimension. This dimension should be engineered
in an atmosphere cleansed of cultural prejudice, and should involve the United States and the southern European
powers in a constructive collaboration. It should also capitalize on the progress made by European Union economic
and diplomatic initiatives, but aspirations in these areas must not overshadow a realistic view of military risks and
capabilities. Most important, it must actively seek to overcome the stigmas that continue to characterize the northsouth relationship if it is to achieve the trust required for stability.
NATO's member countries are already pledged to such goals. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty obliges members
to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations, strengthen free
institutions, bring about better understanding, and promote conditions of stability and well-being. To deny that those
lofty aspirations apply outside of Europe and North America, or to pretend that non-white, non-Christian people do not
share them, would be unworthy of history's most successful and most enlightened international security organization.
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